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ABSTRACT
Over the past decades, cyber attacks have grown in frequency as well as in sophistication.
Often, they elude the counter-measures that are in place due to inadequate expert man-power
that is necessary to manually deploy the correct responses and maintain systems being compro-
mised. We present a decision support framework to aid in timely deployment and maintenance
of e↵ective responses when intrusive or malicious behavior is detected.
The support framework has two specific objectives: to identify the best set of responses given
the knowledge of the attack and the system being protected; and to identify the minimal set of
responses that must be deployed. While appropriateness of responses is of utmost importance
to safeguard systems from attacks, minimality in the number of responses, an important factor
from the deployment and maintainability perspective, has often been discarded. Our framework
leverages National Vulnerability Database as a source for information about the attacks, relies
on the pre-specified expert knowledge about the responses that can adequately stop attack
and takes into considerations the impact of an attack as well as responses on the system being
protected in terms of well-studied CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) vector.
We utilize Trade-o↵ Enhanced Conditional Preference Network (TCP-net) to qualitatively
represent and reason about the CIA priorities of the expert and model the problem of identifying
minimal set of most e↵ective responses into a search problem. The choice of TCP-net stems
from the fact that the CIA priorities are typically qualitative in nature and it has been proven
that quantification of priorities that are inherently qualitative can result in incorrect and often
unexplainable results due to seemingly small perturbations in quantitative measures. Our TCP-
net based computation can generate provably optimal solution where optimality corresponds
to minimality of selected responses. While optimality is an important factor, the necessity
for computing the solution e ciently cannot be overstated, particularly in the context where
timeliness in response deployment is equally important. We investigate and evaluate several
ix
heuristics with the goal of searching part of the potentially large solution space and compute
a solution that is ”close” to the optimal solution. We discuss the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each heuristic, and present a specific one that is e cient in computing the
optimal solution.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades we have seen cyberattacks grow sophisticated and elude the
countermeasures that are in place. Although numerous e↵orts are being taken to strengthen
our defenses, new attacks emerge every day that find loopholes in the defenses. In order to
build an impenetrable cyber defense system, we need to have advanced intrusion detection and
response mechanisms in place. Especially the intrusion response systems needs to be well adept
and robust in responding to an attack that compromises the system. We propose an intrusion
response mechanism that takes heterogenous distributed information coupled with up-to-date
information on attacks from national vulnerability databases (NVD (2007)) to provide the most
e cient responses. We also get CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) triad preferences
from the security administrators so that we can provide responses that uphold the interests of
the organisation.
1.1 Challenges & Objectives
One of the challenges in selecting responses stems from the fact that detections are often im-
precise (Axelsson (2000)) , i.e., an intrusive or anomalous behavior can be attributed to multiple
attacks and, therefore, to the exploitation of multiple weaknesses. As a result, a large number
of responses may be considered as valid and appropriate for the detected intrusive behavior.
While it is important for security critical system to respond to all possible attack scenarios
(Foo et al. (2005)), automated deployment is not likely to be e↵ective because deployment of
unnecessary responses can also harm the system in the same way as an attack. For instance,
responses may unnecessarily update certain configurations or take away privileges, thus impact-
ing the useful and normal behavior of the system leading to DOS (Toth and Kruegel (2002)).
2While automation in deployment may be unwise, manual intervention in selecting responses
even with expert knowledge can be time-consuming and overwhelming making it impractical for
systems where fast and e↵ective response deployment is a necessity. Our objective is to develop
an intrusion response system that would take into account the organization’s Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability preferences and provide intuitive and justifiable guidance in response
selection that would uphold those preferences to the best possible extent, at real time.
1.2 Proposed framework
There are three primary objectives for our work.
1. Ensure protection of the system from attacks : The deployed responses must prevent the
attack from having any negative impact on the system.
2. Ensure minimal impact on the system due to respones deployments: A response is es-
sentially an action that limits the capability of the system which is vulnerable to attack
. Hence automated responses present the risk of negatively impacting the system since
they are deployed without any assessment of its e↵ect on the system. We incorporate a
decision support framework that ensures the responses deployed have the least impact on
the CIA priorities of the organization.
3. Ensure minimal overhead in administering responses by deploying minimal set of re-
sponses: Cost of deployment is a factor that is often overlooked in automated intrusion
response systems. Our heurisitic aims to deploy minimal number of responses which can
e↵ectively prevent the impact of a given set of weaknesses without compromising the
system CIA preferences.
We present a framework that provides sound guidance for administering a minimal set of
responses that are likely to address the detected intrusions and will least impact the system in
a negative fashion. This decision framework has three primary components. First, it requires
the input from the intrusion detection system in terms of weaknesses (wi’s) being exploited.
For this, we use the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), a well-documented source of
3attacks, vulnerabilities and impact of attacks. Second, the framework relies on the mapping
of responses (rj ’s) that can address the exploitation of the weakness (wi 7! {ri1, ri2, . . . , rin}).
And finally, the framework incorporates the knowledge of system preferences in terms of CIA-
impact (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) and the corresponding influence on CIA by
the detected weaknesses (available from NVD) and available responses (typically provided by
system administrators) to assess the quality of responses being selected.
To illustrate the complexities in deciding the correct set of responses, consider a system
where protecting confidentiality and integrity is more important than ensuring availability.
Assume that the detection mechanism identified the exploitation(s) of two weakness w1 and
w2. The exploitation of weakness w1 may result in severe compromise of confidentiality and
no other impact. The exploitation of weakness w2, on the other hand, may result in moder-
ate compromise of both confidentiality and integrity. Each weakness is associated with three
e↵ective responses: ri1, ri2, ri3 for i 2 (1, 2), each with its own value of negative impact on
the system. For instance, r11 may have severe impact on the integrity of the data, while r12
may have moderate impact on the integrity and severe impact on the availability. The goal
is to identify the best possible set of responses that can address exploitation(s) of both the
weaknesses in a timely fashion. The trade-o↵ in the selection will come into play due to the
system requirement. In this example, availability will have the least priority compared to con-
fidentiality and integrity. Even with such a small set of weaknesses and responses, the job can
be unmanageable and error-prone for experts. Furthermore, the task becomes daunting as it
comes with the added requirement to not get out-paced by the detection mechanism, which is
typically automated.
We measure the impact of the weakness/response in terms of CIA. The important aspect
of this is the measuring unit. The impact measures are not quantitative. It has been well-
studied and recommended to not rely on quantitative measures for CIA vector. As a result,
qualitative measures are considered, which may not produce single “best” solution but any
optimal solution can be logically justified.
Finally, in addition to the quality of the selected responses in terms of their ability to stop
intrusions without negatively impacting the system, it is also important to deploy minimal
4number of responses. Minimality brings in new challenges in the section process. Often mini-
mality can be in odds with the quality. Furthermore, minimality is a global property, which can
be correctly computed only after considering all possible choices in the solution, which makes
it di cult to ensure minimality in an e cient fashion.
1.3 Contribution
In light of the above, our work contributes to the response selection process in the following
way:
1. We present Trade-o↵ enhanced Conditional Preference network (TCP-net) to capture
preferences over CIA attributes. The network unambiguously represents qualitative pref-
erences between the attributes and the attribute values.
2. We model the method for identifying the responses as a search process and present 4 search
heuristics that take into consideration the detected exploits, the mapped responses and
the preference specifications to identify the deployable responses.
The heuristics do not explore the entire search-space for all possible set of responses
(which is prohibitively expensive); instead they rely on local and history information in
a search tree to identify the best extensions of the search path. We characterize the
quality of the heuristic-results in terms of the di↵erence between the heuristic-results and
solutions resulting from exploring the entire search-space.
3. We present detailed experimental evaluation by considering di↵erent exploit scenarios. We
show that the order in which the detected exploits are considered for response selection
does not impact the final result, which makes our method appropriate in practice, where
the response selection must work as and when exploits are detected.
4. We implement our method to realize a decision framework. Our framework is modular
and can easily interface with di↵erent intrusion detection mechanisms that can identify
the exploits as specified in NVD. Furthermore, being based on sound preference logic such
as TCP-net, our framework can be also used to logically justify the selection of responses
5in every scenario. This is important in two aspects: for postmortem analysis and for
understanding and possibly updating preferences and response-mappings for future use.
1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we talk about the intrusion
response mechanisms that are currently used, their advantages and disadvantages. We also hy-
pothesize why our approach would overcome those disadvantages. In Section 3, we present our
preference formalism including the dominance relation and analyze its properties. We present
four algorithms for identifying the most preferred compositions and discuss their properties.
We discuss the complexity of each of our algorithms. In Section 4, we present results of ex-
periments that we performed to compare our algorithms in terms of the quality of solutions
produced, performance and e ciency. In Section 5, we summarize our contributions and discuss
the related and future work in this area.
6CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Selecting and deploying responses in the context of detected intrusion has remained one of
the active areas of research both in academia and industry. We will discuss the contribution
of the existing work in light of quality (adaptability, robustness) and degree of automation in
response selection and deployment (Section 2.1). We will also present the need for preferences
to soundly justify the selection process. In particular, we will discuss the appropriateness of
qualitative preferences for response selection and present an overview of qualitative preferences
(Section 2.2).
2.1 Intrusion response systems
Security frameworks rely on two specific mechanisms to protect systems from being compromised–
intrusion detection and intrusion response. The former focuses on detecting the type, voracity
and the cause of the intrusion (Kabiri and Ghorbani (2005); Lazarevic et al. (2005)), while the
latter deals with identifying the possible responses to the attacks (Stakhanova et al. (2007);
Shameli-Sendi et al. (2012)). In some frameworks, detection and response are tightly coupled
to provide e cient feedback to the detection mechanism about the result of deployment of some
responses and possibly re-assess the type and the cause of the intrusion (Rowe et al. (1999)). In
others, the coupling is intentionally left loose to avoid incorrect over-fitting and to allow quick
plug-n-play (Papadaki and Furnell (2006); Lewandowski et al. (2001)). We present a frame-
work for response selection that can be used in conjunction with any detection mechanism that
can identify information about the weaknesses (configurations, privileges) of the system being
exploited by the detected attack(s).
7Table 2.1 Some of the existing Intrusion response systems
Reference IRS mechanism
Kanoun et al. (2010) access control policies
Jahnke et al. (2007) attack path of intrusion
Kheir et al. (2009) minimal cost of response
Thames et al. (2008) firewall
Zhang et al. (2003) logs the attack data for forensics
Figure 2.1 Code red attack is blocked successfully Figure 2.2 Code red attack succeeds
Surveys such as Stakhanova et al. (2007); Shameli-Sendi et al. (2012); Anuar et al. (2010)
present several techniques and the mechanims they employ to react to an attack. These are
tabularized in Table 2.1 . Some systems try to find the source of the intrusion by employing
several counter-espionage mechanisms. For example, Wang et al. (2002) injects a watermark
into the backward connection of the intrusion, and wake up and colloborate with intermedi-
ate routers along the intrusion path to determine the source of intrusion and respond to it.
Lewandowski et al. (2001) specify how an e↵ective IRS framework should be designed by co-
ordinating information from multiple sources to deploy an e↵ective defense against fast and
distributed information attacks. Though the above systems were e↵ective in a number of cases,
the potential and e↵ectiveness of these systems to provide automatic, pre-emptive, pro-active
responses (Stakhanova et al. (2007)) were limited.
Bass (2000) paved the way for how an IDS must be designed in order to be most e cient
at detecting sophisticated attacks by making use of information from a variety of sensors and
8databases. We feel that this design needs to be extended to IRS as well. Most of the IRS engines
which work along with IDS does not leverage the complete heterogenous set of information
available to IDS while providing responses. Instead they provide responses that are static
mappings between identified malicious event and response. For example , Lets consider the
scenarios in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. When an IDS detects a codeRed attack, it sends a
notification to the IRS that codeRed has been identified. The IRS responds by blocking all
network tra c on port 80. This should work most of the time (works in the scenario shown in
Figure 2.1). But if the codeRed was actually happening on a di↵erent port (Figure 2.2), then
the response would have no e↵ect. Though every information about an attack is be available
to the IDS, it is not communicated to the IRS along with the alert notification. Because of
this, current IRS systems though good at responding to known attacks lack the capability to
respond to unknown and sophisticated attacks.
Responses can either be signal-oriented , those which are targeted to thwart the impact
of the malicious signals or they can be resource-oriented, those that are aimed at protecting
a resource from any attack. We can think of signal as the cause of an attack and resource
being compromised as the e↵ect of an attack. Its easier and sensible to prevent the cause from
have any e↵ect at all rather than stopping the e↵ect. And also due of the complex nature
of the cyber attacks these days, we beleive that a signal-oriented approach would be more
e cient. Consider the following example. A CodeRed attack happens via a GET request
which contains code that exploits a bu↵er overflow vulnerability in the indexing software in
Microsoft’s Internet Information Server(IIS).This vulnerability allows the worm to run code
from within the IIS server. A signal-oriented approach in this scenario detects the malicious
signal and blocks communication on that port. Whereas, a resource-oriented approach needs
to know that the particular resource is being attacked in order to deploy countermeasures to
safeguard the resource from that attack. But this largely depends on the granularity of the
definition of resource. In order to e↵ectively thwart the attack, the entity under attack should
have been defined as a resource. In case of CodeRed resource is the IIS server. And this might
di↵er from attack to attack and that makes it di cult to design a resource-oriented approach.
9Figure 2.3 TCP-net
Unlike an IDS, the e↵ectiveness of responding to an attack is not entirely dependant on the
signals causing the attack but also dependant on the setup of the system environment. Hence
we also use system specific knowledge of the organization’s infrastructure while responding to
the attacks. Through NVD we estimate how the attack would have manifested on a given
infrastrucutre. We also get the CIA triad preferences from the security administrator in order
to provide more appropriate mission sensitive responses. At the end of the process, we provide
the security administrator of the organisation with a partial order of responses that will be
ranked based on their e↵ectiveness whilst preserving the preferences of the organisation.
2.2 Qualitative preferences
We measure the impact of the weakness/response in terms of CIA. The important aspect of
this is the measuring unit. The impact measures are not quantitative. It has been well-studied
and recommended to not rely on quantitative measures for CIA vector as (a) quantitative mea-
sures may incorrectly impose measurable degree of severities of impact and (b) seemingly small
perturbations in the quantitative measures can result in a incorrect and often unexplainable
results (Jansen (2009); Bartol et al. (2009)). As a result, qualitative measures are considered,
which may not produce single “best” solution but any optimal solution can be logically justified.
To identify such an optimal set of responses, it is necessary to have formal framework to
represent and reason with the preferences over values of the CIA attributes of the targeted
weaknesses and responses, as well as relative importance over them. We use the qualitative
preference formalism TCP-net Brafman et al. (2006) to represent and reason with the qualita-
tive preferences of the admin.
Each node in the TCP-net is labeled with an attribute and annotated with the preference
over its values (intra-attribute preference). The edges between the nodes denote relative im-
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portance: the attribute at the destination node is relatively more important than the one at
the source node.
2.2.1 Semantics of TCP-nets
The semantics for TCP-nets is based on the “ceteris paribus” interpretation of its state-
ments Boutilier et al. (1999). In the context of preferences over CIA attributes, this interpre-
tation is as follows. Consider two weaknesses (or responses) with CIA impacts represented by
↵ and   respectively, each of which is a triple containing the values of C, I and A attributes
(a triple is a generic term, and can be used to denote the CIA attributes of a weakness or a
response). We refer to the value of the attribute X in ↵ by ↵(X).   is said to be preferred to
↵, denoted by     ↵, if and only if the valuations of a subset of  ’s attributes can be changed
to obtain another triple  0, such that the following two conditions hold.
1. For some attribute, X 2 {C, I,A},  (X)  X  0(X); and for all attributes Y s.t. Y ⇤X,
 (Y ) =  0(Y ) or  (Y )  Y  0(Y )
2.  0   ↵ or  0 = ↵
Note that the above is a recursive definition of the preference relation   between triples
(Rule 2 requires  0 to be preferred to ↵). Hence in general, checking whether   is preferred to
↵ involves searching for the existence of a sequence of triples  0i (i = 1..n) such that      01  
. . .    0n = ↵.
In our example, the response strengthenFirewall is preferred to blockUserAccount be-
cause the valuation of strengthenFirewall, namely (N, P, P) can be first changed to  01 =(P,
P, P) (confidentiality impact is changed from none to partial), and then again to  02 =(P, P,
N), which is the valuation of blockUserAccount.
2.2.2 Non-dominated set
Given a set of CIA triples and TCP-net preferences over them, the semantics of TCP-
net induces a partial ordering over the triples Brafman et al. (2006). This ordering can
be represented as a directed graph over the triples, such that there is an edge from one
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triple ↵ to another   whenever     ↵. The set of most preferred triples with respect to
the TCP-net is then the roots of this induced graph, and called the non-dominated set of
triples. In other words, a triple   is in the non-dominated set if there is no triple ↵ such
that ↵    . For example, suppose that the admin wants to find the most-preferred re-
sponse(s) from the set {blockUserAccount, performForensics, temporaryShutdown}. The
preferences induced by the TCP-net in Figure 2.3 over this set are: (a) temporaryShutdown
  performForensics, and (b) blockUserAccount   performForensics. Hence, the non-
dominated set is {temporaryShutdown, blockUserAccount}.
2.3 Cyber attacks
Reports of threats predictions, (mca (2016); cnb (2015)) cite that ransomware is one of the
most prominent and dangerous threats to both organizations and personal computers. Ran-
somware is an interesting example to look at because most IRS have failed to stop this attack.
Ransomware has been so detrimental and elusive because detecting it would require monitoring
of both system level and network level events. Therefore, In order to successfully respond to
these threats the IRS engine needs to use information from various heterogeneous distributed
agents and thereby provide more reliable IRS service. This is a important goal to be achieved
for any security-decision systems which must identify,track and respond to complex multiple
threats. For example, the input into such systems would consist of numerous distributed packet
sni↵ers, log files, SNMP traps, user profile databases ,system messages and operator commands.
This would aid in the IRS to serve more e cient and appropriate responses. New strains of
ransomware are being released into internet every day which makes it increasingly di cult to
respond to it. In order to be better equiped to handle such threats , we need to utilise some kind
of shared data model which would allow the response engine to reason about events in a cooper-
ative way. We know that multi-million dollar e↵orts are being taken by number of cybersecurity
organisations worldwide to provide up-to-date information on attacks and vulnerabilities. We
propose a federative data model for security systems that utilises such shared NVD databases
to query and assert knowledge about security incidents and the context in which they occur.
12
We feel that such sophistication is necessitated by the complex and advanced nature of cyber
attacks these days which always seems to be one step ahead of the cybersecurity e↵orts.
13
CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND PROCEDURES
The main motive of our work is to develop an autonomous intrusion response system that
would take into account the preferences of the organization and deploy responses that would
uphold these given preferences, and e↵ectively counter the weakness at minimal cost. In order
to acheive this, we need to be able to compare the preference values of a given entity(weakness
or attack) and be able to optimally derive a set of responses that are minimal in size, best in
terms of preferential quality and e↵ectively stop a given set of attacks. In this chapter,we will
dive deep into the methods we have used to get this desired result.
3.0.1 Illustrative Example.
Consider a system administrator (admin) in charge of securing a mission critical network.
At any point in time, the admin observes a set of attacks on the network, and has to apply
a set of responses to address the weaknesses exploited and mitigate potential adverse security
impacts to the system and the contained data. We measure security impacts to a system in
Figure 3.1 Example scenario showing a set of attacks observed (CVE’s), the corresponding
weakness (CWE’s), and the responses that can address the respective weaknesses.
The CIA impacts of weaknesses and responses are given in parentheses; N = none,
P = partial, C = complete.
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terms of the classical CIA model: confidentiality (C) is impacted when sensitive information is
leaked to attackers, integrity (I) is impacted when the attacker is able to tamper with sensitive
information, and availability (A) is impacted when the attacker can cause a kind of denial of
service.
Each attack exploits one or more weaknesses in the system. The NVD database is an index
of weaknesses and their adverse impacts on a system. In particular, NVD provides information
on whether each weakness partially (P), completely (C), or does not at all (N) adversely impact
the system with respect to the CIA attributes. Similarly, the admin may have at his disposal one
or more responses to address each weakness. Note that applying a response may also adversely
impact the system, as it may restrict certain operations by genuine users (e.g., blocking an IP
will have an availability impact on the system). Hence, similarly to NVD provided data for
weaknesses, the admin can associate each response with a CIA impact value of P, C, or N.
Consider the attack scenario in Figure 3.1, where an admin seeks a set of responses (subset
from the right hand side) to address a set of attacks (left hand side) that exploit certain
weaknesses (middle column) in the system. The CIA impacts of the weaknesses and responses
are depicted alongside their names. For this example, the natural preferences over the impact
values of C, I and A attributes are used – N  X P, P  X C, and the relative importance
preferences stated by the admin are: C ⇤ A and C ⇤ I, i.e., confidentiality is more important
than availability and integrity. Multiple di↵erent sets of responses can be identified to address
the attacks being detected. Graphically, a solution set consists of responses such that each
attack has a path to some response in the set (Figure 3.1). The objective is to identify the
solution that is most preferred and contains the smallest number of responses.
To identify such an optimal set of responses, it is necessary to have formal framework to
represent and reason with the preferences over values of the CIA attributes of the targeted
weaknesses and responses, as well as relative importance over them. We use the qualitative
preference formalism TCP-net to represent and reason with the qualitative preferences of the
admin.
The TCP-net representation of the admin preferences in this examples is shown in Fig-
ure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 TCP-net
In addition to ordering individual responses per the TCP-net, it is necessary to order sets
of responses, as a given attack scenario may demand multiple responses to be applied. For
example, if CWE-119 and CWE-120 are both exploited in an attack, the admin can choose
from four possible sets of responses, namely pairs with one element from each of the sets {patch,
blockIP} and {blockIpPort, blockApp}.
We use the approach developed in Santhanam et al. (2011) to compare sets of attribute
values, summarized as follows. First, we obtain the aggregated valuation of the set of responses
with respect to C, I and A as a function of the impact values of the corresponding attribute in
each constituent response. Specifically, we consider the worst valuation of attribute X amongst
all the responses in the set as the valuation of X for the set. For example, the aggregate
valuation of the set {blockIP, blockApp} is (N, P, C) because blockApp has the worst valuation
for the CIA attributes, similarly, any response paired with patch has an aggregate valuation of
(C, C, C). We then use the aggregated valuation of the sets of responses to compare and choose
the most preferred according to the admin’s preferences. Hence, in the above example, the set
{blockIP, blockIpPort} would be the most preferred, which is preferred to the set {blockIP,
blockApp}. The other two response sets containing patch would be the least preferred for
the admin because they have the worst possible valuation. The concept of non-dominated
set defined over individual triples can also be applied to sets of responses by comparing sets
of responses with respect to their aggregated valuation. In this example, however, the non-
dominated set is a singleton, i.e., {{blockIP, blockIpPort}}.
3.1 Preferential Selection and Minimization
Our primary objective is to select a set of responses for a given set of the detected attacks.
The attacks result from the exploiting certain system configurations (weaknesses). The selection
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process takes into consideration the system preferences in terms of CIA and obtains the set of
responses that will not only mitigate the weaknesses but also will be most preferred as per the
system preferences. As noted before, considering the preferences and priorities of the system
is important, as there are many di↵erent ways in which weaknesses can be addressed, which
can result in di↵erent sets of responses. Another important aspect in response selection is the
number of responses necessary to address the detected attacks; smaller number of responses
are likely to be preferred than larger.
Therefore, in terms of computation, our objective can be realized by (a) exploring the
solution space where each solution is defined by the set of responses that can mitigate the
weaknesses causing the detected attacks, and (b) identifying the ones that are most preferred
in terms of the CIA preferences and size. Note that, the number of solutions in the solution
space can be very large depending on the number of possible responses being considered; and
there can be multiple valid solution that are equally preferred (or indistinguishable in terms of
preferences).
It is immediate that exploring the entire solution space is impractical as the likely overhead
in terms of time will be prohibitively large. Therefore, it is important to identify methods
and heuristics that do not explore the entire solution space but are still capable in computing
results “close” to the valid solutions. We will discuss 4 such heuristics and characterize them in
terms of the quality of the results computed by them. The quality of a solution will capture its
degree of di↵erence with the best solution (computed by exploring the entire solution space).
3.1.1 Search Tree and Heuristics
In the following, we describe the basic outline for a generic heuristic method and then discuss
the application of the heuristics. The solution space can be viewed as a tree of responses; we will
refer to this as the search tree. At every level (except the root) of the search tree, we consider a
weakness being addressed. For each weakness, there can be many responses, which represent the
branching factor for that level. For instance, if at level 1, the weakness w1 can be addressed by
three di↵erent responses: r11, r12, r13, then the number of branches from the root of the search
tree is 3, each branch leading to a node corresponding to the response. Therefore, the nodes
17
in the tree are choice points and the choices are branches corresponding to the selection of a
response. If at level 2, the weakness w2 can be addressed by two responses: r21, r22, then for
every branch of the level 1 (which represents the selection of a specific response), there will
be two branches at level 2. A solution is one where at least one response has been selected in
every level of the search tree. Figure 3.5 illustrates one such search tree.
There are three aspects in any heuristics that computes the solution in this search tree:
(a) the order in which the weaknesses are considered, (b) the order in which the responses at
di↵erent level are considered, and (c) the context in which these orders are considered in the
selection. While the aspects (a) and (b) are immediate, the aspect (c) denotes the extent to
which the selection at the i-level can be impacted by those made at j 6= i levels.
3.1.1.1 GreedyCIA.
In this heuristic, the weakness are considered in the order they are detected to be exploited
(in essence, in some random order). The best response with respect to CIA preferences are
selected at each level. The primary reason for the greedy approach is e ciency. Once a choice
is made at a particular level, other choices at that level or at levels above it are never explored.
3.1.1.2 wCoverageIrCIA.
In this heuristic, the weakness are ordered in terms of the strength/coverage of the responses
that can address them. That is, if the responses for weakness wi (level i) can address n
weaknesses, if the responses for weakness wj (level j) can address m weaknesses, and if n > m,
then i must be higher than j. The intuition behind such ordering is to increase the likelihood
of selecting responses with higher coverage, thus minimizing the total number of responses in
the solution.
The response selection utilizes the system preferences with respect to the CIA values. The
heuristics relies on the history of selection (see aspect (c) above)—at every level an ordered
list of partial solutions are maintained, and most preferred among the partial solutions is
considered. Note that, the partial solutions in the ordered list may not address the same set
of weaknesses. Further note that, each partial solution has a CIA value computed using worst
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Figure 3.3 Result of applying wCoverageIrCIA
valuation (see Section 2.2); we will denote this value as the  -value. If there are two partial
solutions that have the same  -value or their  -values are indistinguishable with respect to the
system preferences, then their mutual order is chosen randomly.
For instance, consider a situation where at level i, ri1 and ri2 are the possible choices and
due to better CIA values ri1 is chosen for further exploration in the search tree. At level
j = i + 1, the choices are rj1 and rj2 , and the CIA values associated with these responses are
such that the combined CIA value of the pairs ri1 , rj1 and ri1 , rj2 are both worse than the CIA
value for ri2 ; and specifically, CIA value of ri1 , rj1 is worse that ri1 , rj2 . In this case, the order
list of partial solutions at level j will have ri2 proceeded by the pairs ri1 , rj1 followed by ri1 , rj2 ,
and search tree will explored by considering the choices rj1 and rj2 in the context of ri2 .
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Figure 3.4 Result of applying rCIA
3.1.1.3 rCIA.
In this method, there is no specific order in which the weaknesses are considered. The
responses are selected using the same process as in wCoverageIrCIA.
3.1.1.4 rCIAIrCoverage.
In this method, there is no specific order in which the weaknesses are considered. The
responses are selected using the same process as in wCoverageIrCIA with an augmentation to
take into consideration the coverage aspect of each response. The augmentation involves the
ordering of partial solutions that are indistinguishable (see Section 2.2) based on their  -values
and preferences over them. In such a case, the partial solution whose coverage size is larger is
placed higher in the order. Intuitively, this is likely to lead to smaller size solutions eventually.
Note that the coverage measure comparison of the responses is a context-sensitive infor-
mation requiring the knowledge of weaknesses being considered. A response may have higher
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coverage than another as the former is applicable in addressing larger number of weaknesses
than the latter; but that does not imply that the former is a better choice than the latter in
any context. For instance, consider the situation where r1 can address w1, w2, r2 can address
w3 and the weaknesses being detected is w3.
In this heuristic, we assume knowledge of weaknesses that we have already considered in
the search tree (history context) and also use the knowledge of weakness that will be considered
in one step (look-ahead context). The reason for limiting the look-ahead context is to ensure
that the response selection at each step does not necessarily require the complete knowledge
of all weaknesses; thus making the heuristics applicable on-the-fly as and when the detection
engine provides information about weaknesses.
It can proved that in all the proposed heuristics other than the GreedyCIA, the most pre-
ferred (or more precisely, one of the non-dominated) solution will be computed. Intuitively, the
proof relies on the fact that the search path that can produce a preferred partial solution, will
be always explored. When the CIA value of the responses in a partial solution in a search path
falls below (in terms of system preferences) the CIA value of response in a partial solution in
another path, the search progresses along the latter and stores the current search path. This
technique is based on the algorithm proposed by Santhanam et al. Santhanam et al. (2008) for
e cient composition of services using qualitative preferences. Note that, the heuristics (other
than GreedyCIA) has di↵erent characteristics in terms of the size of the solution. We claim
that rCIAIrCoverage is best suited to obtain a solution that is most preferred and is likely to
be the smallest. The following example illustrates the search process for rCIAIrCoverage.
Example. Consider the search tree in Figure 3.5 resulting from the weaknesses presented
at each level and the system preference that confidentiality is relatively more important than
both integrity and availability. Each level is associated with a weakness and the branches at
the levels correspond to candidate responses mapped to the weakness at that level. Each node
is annotated with the  -value representing the CIA value of the partial solution obtained. The
nodes are also annotated with a number; the number refers to the step at which the node is
considered to be part of the partial solution. The root, therefore, is annotated with  -value
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Figure 3.5 Result of applying rCIAIrCoverage
(NC , NI , NA) denoting the partial solution (at this point no responses are selected) does not
negatively impact the confidentiality, integrity and availability. At Level 1, the weakness being
considered is CWE-120 (note that in rCIAIrCoverage we do not consider any specific ordering
of weaknesses) and there are two possible responses that can address them. The  -values for
each of the selection indicates that blockIpport is a better choice and as a result, the search
tree is expanded following this choice. At Level 2, both stopDwnload and blockIP have the
same  -value. As both these responses are considered, they are annotated with the number
3 indicating that at step 3 these responses have the same  -value. As per the heuristics, the
tie is broken using the coverage of these responses over known weaknesses including CWE-264
(with one-step look-ahead), and blockIP is selected as the response at levels 2 and 3 (at this
point). Proceeding further, at steps 4, 5, and 6 blockIP has coverage over weaknesses at
levels 3, 4 and 5, thus maintaining the same  -value. In all these steps, selection of blockIP
is preferred to stopDwnload because of the coverage value. However, at step 7, the partial
solution of responses at level 6 involving firewall has a  -value, which is less preferred than
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the partial solution computed (and not explored) at level 2 involving stopDwnload. As a result,
our heuristic, proceeds to explore the search tree starting from stopDwnload at level 2.
At step 8, There are two partial solutions at level 3 that includes blkPermit or blockIP
that has the same  -value. Amongst them since blockIP has a known high coverage (since we
have already have knowledge of all detected weaknesses until level 6), that node is chosen for
further expansion through steps 9, 10 till a similar situation arises where the partial solution
of responses at level 6 have a  -value that is less preferred to the  -value of the partial solution
at level 2 involving blkPermit.
Hence at step 11, the blkPermit node is expanded through steps 12, 13 up to level 6.
Now interestingly at step 14, we are faced with three alternatives to choose from, that are all
indistinguishable from each other:
{blockIpport, blockIp, firewall}
{blockIpport, stopDwnload, blockIp, firewall}
{blockIpport, stopDwnload, blkPermit, blockIp, firewall}
Now the heuristic looks for the solution that has covered the highest number of weaknesses
among the options. This is still a tie since every option covers 6 weaknesses. Then the heuristic
identifies the solution that has used minimal number of responses to achieve that coverage .
This results in the final solution set consisting of (blockIpport , blockIP and firewall), thus
ensuring both quality in terms of system preferences and minimality in terms of response set.
Eventhough rCIA and wCoverageIrCIA provide results that are indistinguishable in terms
of systems preferences to rCIAIrCoverage, it is seen in the Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.3 that
several decisions made by the former pair of heuristics respectively, were not able to provide
the same quality in terms of minimality and time taken as that of the rCIAIrCoverage. This
is because they make random decisions whenever there is a tie in selecting the node to expand.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
4.0.1 Experimental setup
We have conducted experiments using as inputs the attacks (CVE-ids), associated weak-
nesses (CWE-ids) and their CIA impacts from the NVD. The responses are targeted at stopping
a weakness from being exploited. Note that, di↵erent attacks may exploit the same weakness(es)
and hence instead of mapping the responses to possible attacks, it is more intuitive and valu-
able to map the responses to the weakness that may be exploited. In our experiments, we do
not consider uncertainty and assume that any response mapped to a weakness will be able to
stop the attacks that solely rely on exploiting those weaknesses. However, as has been noted
before, any response, in addition to minimizing the negative impact of allowing an attack to
go unmanaged, may incur some negative impact due to its own deployment. Our objective in
the experiments is to present the solutions that takes into consideration the trade-o↵ between
deploying di↵erent set of responses.
There are two di↵erent experiments. In the first experimental setup shown in table 4.1, we
have used two sets of 12 di↵erent system preferences. For each data set, we have considered
7 di↵erent attacks with 6 associated weaknesses, and 12 relevant responses. Each weakness
has at least one response mapped to it and the maximum number of responses associated to
mitigating a weakness is 5. In the second experimental setup we used a subset of size 4 from the
above set of weaknesses and ran the same tests. This is shown in table 4.3. The CIA metrics
for the attacks/weakness are obtained from the NVD, while the negative impact for deploying
the responses are assigned based our understanding and knowledge of the responses. In some
cases, the same response may be deployable to address multiple weaknesses; the corresponding
negative impact (in terms of CIA) of the response, therefore, can be context-dependent (context
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being the weakness(es) it is addressing). In our experiments, we have considered the worst
values for the CIA for a response, if it has two or more sets of CIA values representing its
negative impact.
4.0.2 Evaluation criteria
We have evaluated the solutions (set of responses) obtained by applying the four heuristics
in two dimensions: the quality of the solutions in terms of the CIA values (preferences with
respect to the system preferences) and the size of the response set (smaller being better).
Tables 4.1 and 4.3 presents the experimental results. The first column presents the system
preferences. For instance, the first row in both datasets presents the preference: C ⇤ A ⇤ I
denoting that protecting confidentiality is more important that ensuring availability, which is
more important than ensuring integrity. The second column presents the size of the result-set
(number of responses necessary) for the “base case”—the base case corresponds to the ideal
situation where all possible response-sets are considered by exploring the entire search tree
and the best (in terms of system preferences) and the smallest set is selected. So, for the
C⇤A⇤ I, the size of the most preferred set of responses is 3. The subsequent columns present
the solutions corresponding to our heuristics; for each heuristic the size of the result-set is
presented along with whether or not the result-set is as preferred (column title comp? short for
comparable) as the base case results. Note that, due to the qualitative nature of preferences
(see Section 2.2), more than one result may have the same quality with respect to the system
preferences.
4.0.3 Observation
The key observations from the experiments are as follows. GreedyCIA, as expected, is the
fastest running heuristic. However, it cannot consistently compute the results that are either
the smallest or the most preferred. This method may be applicable in less critical systems
where the system preferences are inconsequential. wCoverageIrCIA and rCIA are comparable
in terms of time and the quality of results. In the former case, coverage is considered indirectly
in terms of ordering of weaknesses; however, that does not impact the quality of results in
25
Table 4.1 Experimental Results
Sy
s.
pr
ef
er
en
ce
Ba
se
Li
ne
Gr
ee
dy
CI
A
wC
ov
er
ag
eI
rC
IA
rC
IA
rC
IA
Ir
Co
ve
ra
ge
size size co
m
p?
tim
e
size co
m
p?
tim
e
size co
m
p?
tim
e
size co
m
p?
tim
e
Dataset 1
C ⇤A⇤ I 3 6 yes 0.07 3 yes 3.12 5 yes 3.53 3 yes 1.28
A⇤ C ⇤ I 3 6 no 0.06 5 yes 5.00 5 yes 4.12 3 yes 2.21
C ⇤A 3 6 yes 0.07 5 yes 2.56 4 yes 2.37 3 yes 1.01
A⇤ C 3 6 no 0.07 5 yes 5.45 5 yes 7.18 3 yes 2.34
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 3 6 yes 0.08 3 yes 4.37 5 yes 6.32 3 yes 1.09
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 3 6 no 0.07 3 yes 2.32 3 yes 4.45 3 yes 0.58
I ⇤A⇤ C 3 6 no 0.10 4 yes 5.04 3 yes 5.12 3 yes 1.11
I ⇤ C ⇤A 3 6 yes 0.05 3 yes 2.56 4 yes 4.56 3 yes 1.36
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 3 6 no 0.07 4 yes 6.51 5 yes 6.57 3 yes 2.01
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 3 6 yes 0.08 4 yes 4.32 4 yes 8.12 3 yes 2.21
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 3 6 yes 0.07 5 yes 2.01 3 yes 3.12 3 yes 0.24
A⇤ I 3 6 yes 0.09 4 yes 3.25 4 yes 4.11 3 yes 1.00
Dataset 2
C ⇤A⇤ I 3 5 yes 0.07 4 yes 2.48 3 yes 3.55 3 yes 0.30
A⇤ C ⇤ I 4 6 yes 0.08 5 yes 3.49 4 yes 4.21 4 yes 1.03
C ⇤A 3 6 no 0.07 3 yes 7.59 4 yes 8.11 3 yes 3.10
A⇤ C 4 6 yes 0.06 5 yes 4.12 4 yes 2.27 4 yes 1.11
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 3 5 yes 0.06 5 yes 3.14 3 yes 3.11 3 yes 0.40
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 4 6 yes 0.08 4 yes 4.32 4 yes 5.46 4 yes 2.10
I ⇤A⇤ C 4 6 yes 0.07 4 yes 1.43 4 yes 2.45 4 yes 0.57
I ⇤ C ⇤A 3 6 no 0.06 4 yes 1.35 3 yes 3.10 3 yes 1.10
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 4 6 yes 0.07 5 yes 3.00 4 yes 5.46 4 yes 2.23
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 3 6 no 0.06 3 yes 4.32 4 yes 7.23 4 yes 2.56
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 3 6 yes 0.07 5 yes 2.31 4 yes 4.54 3 yes 1.45
A⇤ I 3 6 no 0.07 4 yes 4.22 5 yes 8.35 4 yes 3.22
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Table 4.2 Experimental Results
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Dataset 1
C ⇤A⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.01 4 yes 0.21 2 yes 0.02 2 yes 0.01
A⇤ C ⇤ I 2 4 no 0.01 4 yes 2.19 2 yes 0.03 2 yes 0.02
C ⇤A 2 4 yes 0.03 3 yes 0.31 2 yes 0.16 2 yes 0.06
A⇤ C 2 4 no 0.07 4 yes 1.37 2 yes 0.06 2 yes 0.06
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.05 4 yes 0.17 2 yes 0.08 2 yes 0.06
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 2 4 no 0.06 2 yes 2.02 2 yes 0.09 2 yes 0.08
I ⇤A⇤ C 2 4 no 0.05 4 yes 1.22 2 yes 0.10 2 yes 0.08
I ⇤ C ⇤A 2 4 yes 0.05 2 yes 0.25 2 yes 0.12 2 yes 0.06
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 2 4 no 0.05 2 yes 1.19 2 yes 0.09 2 yes 0.14
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.04 4 yes 0.56 2 yes 0.25 2 yes 0.14
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 2 4 yes 0.06 3 yes 1.22 2 yes 0.08 2 yes 0.13
A⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.04 2 yes 0.20 2 yes 0.25 2 yes 0.12
Dataset 2
C ⇤A⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.01 4 yes 0.10 4 yes 0.03 4 yes 0.05
A⇤ C ⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.01 3 yes 0.31 2 yes 0.04 2 yes 0.02
C ⇤A 2 4 yes 0.07 3 yes 0.30 3 yes 0.42 4 yes 0.10
A⇤ C 2 3 yes 2.27 5 yes 4.12 2 yes 0.01 2 yes 0.02
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.06 4 yes 0.18 2 yes 0.09 2 yes 0.06
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 2 4 yes 0.04 4 yes 1.39 2 yes 0.02 2 yes 0.01
I ⇤A⇤ C 2 4 yes 0.05 3 yes 0.43 2 yes 0.02 2 yes 0.03
I ⇤ C ⇤A 2 4 no 0.05 2 yes 0.46 2 yes 0.31 2 yes 0.43
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 2 4 yes 0.08 2 yes 1.33 2 yes 0.03 2 yes 0.04
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 2 4 no 0.06 2 yes 1.18 4 yes 0.42 2 yes 0.04
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 2 4 yes 0.05 4 yes 0.46 2 yes 0.16 2 yes 0.05
A⇤ I 2 4 no 0.05 4 yes 0.26 2 yes 1.16 2 yes 0.04
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Table 4.3 Summary of Experimental Results
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Dataset 1
C ⇤A⇤ I 0% 60% 0.01 0% 100% 0.21 70% 100% 0.02 100% 100% 0.01
A⇤ C ⇤ I 0% 0% 0.01 0% 100% 2.19 70% 100% 0.03 100% 100% 0.02
C ⇤A 0% 80% 0.03 40% 100% 0.31 80% 100% 0.16 100% 100% 0.06
A⇤ C 0% 10% 0.07 0% 100% 1.37 70% 100% 0.06 80% 100% 0.06
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 0% 30% 0.05 0% 100% 0.17 100% 100% 0.08 100% 100% 0.06
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 0% 60% 0.06 80% 100% 2.02 100% 100% 0.09 100% 100% 0.08
I ⇤A⇤ C 0% 30% 0.05 0% 100% 1.22 90% 100% 0.10 90% 100% 0.08
I ⇤ C ⇤A 0% 90% 0.05 100% 100% 0.25 60% 100% 0.12 100% 100% 0.06
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 0% 100% 0.05 90% 100% 1.19 70% 100% 0.09 100% 100% 0.14
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 0% 80% 0.04 0% 100% 0.56 90% 100% 0.25 100% 100% 0.14
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 0% 70% 0.06 20% 100% 1.22 100% 100% 0.08 100% 100% 0.13
A⇤ I 0% 50% 0.04 80% 100% 0.20 90% 100% 0.25 90% 100% 0.12
Dataset 2
C ⇤A⇤ I 10% 90% 0.01 0% 100% 0.10 20% 100% 0.03 90% 100% 0.05
A⇤ C ⇤ I 10% 90% 0.01 40% 100% 0.31 40% 100% 0.04 100% 100% 0.02
C ⇤A 10% 90% 0.07 60% 100% 0.30 50% 100% 0.42 100% 100% 0.10
A⇤ C 10% 60% 2.27 0% 100% 4.12 90% 100% 0.01 80% 100% 0.02
C ⇤A;C ⇤ I 10% 100% 0.06 0% 100% 0.18 70% 100% 0.09 100% 100% 0.06
A⇤ C;A⇤ I 10% 100% 0.04 0% 100% 1.39 80% 100% 0.02 100% 100% 0.01
I ⇤A⇤ C 10% 90% 0.05 50% 100% 0.43 90% 100% 0.02 100% 100% 0.03
I ⇤ C ⇤A 10% 40% 0.05 90% 100% 0.46 70% 100% 0.31 80% 100% 0.43
A⇤ C; I ⇤ C 10% 0% 0.08 80% 100% 1.33 80% 100% 0.03 100% 100% 0.04
C ⇤ I;A⇤ I 10% 20% 0.06 70% 100% 1.18 30% 100% 0.42 100% 100% 0.04
I ⇤ C; I ⇤A 10% 30% 0.05 0% 100% 0.46 10% 100% 0.16 100% 100% 0.05
A⇤ I 10% 70% 0.05 0% 100% 0.26 70% 100% 1.16 100% 90% 0.04
terms of minimizing the size of the solution. In the latter case, the coverage is not considered
as a criteria for response selection and weaknesses do not have any specific ordering. In short,
the experiments reveal that the ordering of weaknesses does not impact the quality of the
solution in terms of CIA preferences. Finally, the rCIAIrCoverage method has taken less
time than both wCoverageIrCIA and rCIA, and also performs better in terms of quality of the
results. The reason for taking less time can be attributed to the fact that indistinguishability
between partial solutions during exploration are taken care of using coverage, which reduces
the breadth of exploration in the search tree. As a result, the number of responses is minimal
because coverage is directly considered to guide the search path. Therefore, in general, we can
conclude that rCIAIrCoverage is likely to outperform the other heuristics as per the evaluation
criteria.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
We present a road-map for incorporating qualitative preferences and priorities in selecting
responses. We present four heuristic methods to realize the road-map and present experimental
evaluations characterizing the quality of the results in terms of the CIA values and the size.
The methods can be applied on-the-fly, i.e., as when weaknesses are detected. This is because
the order in which weaknesses are considered does not impact the optimality of the solution in
terms of the CIA value. We have shown that rCIAIrCoverage method is likely to be the best
heuristic.
As part of future work, we plan to further develop the framework with clearly defined
interfaces to allow easy plug-n-play with existing intrusion detection engines. Additionally,
we plan to include context-sensitive information in response selection process. One of the
context-sensitive information that we have ignored (for simplicity) involves the parameters of
responses.
For instance, the response blockIp requires the parameter, an IP address, to be e↵ective.
Once such parameters are considered, then the minimality of the solution will not only depend
on the type of the responses in the solution set but also the parameters used in the responses—
blockIp applied on two di↵erent IP address will have to be counted as a two di↵erent response.
This will be a straightforward extension to our methods.
Another type of context information involves the CIA values representing the negative
impact of the responses. In our current setting, we have considered that the negative impact
of a response is the worst possible value it can have with respect to CIA. As a result, when
comparing two or more responses, our comparison uses these worst values. However, one can
also consider comparing responses in the context of the weaknesses for which they are being
considered. Such context-sensitivity is likely to bring in dependency of the heuristics on the
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ordering of weaknesses (a priori knowledge of all detected weaknesses) and therefore, may not
be practical in general. We plan to investigate extensions of our methods that can incorporate
this level of context-sensitivity without compromising on the quality of results and the e ciency
of the computation.
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